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Relations between the United States and the nations of
Central America have, historically, been plagued by short
term, interventionist policies. To be sure, some nations
have cooperated more than others with the United States, in
areas of Western Hemispheric politics. Certainly, one of
the more obvious instruments of policy between nations is
military force. A nation's ability to wield such force
often determines the success of that nation's political
initiatives and policies towards other nations. This
condition is abundantly clear in the Central American
region, as the United States has effectively employed what
is popularly regarded as "gunboat diplomacy" on numerous
occasions to achieve desired political and economic ends.
This study focuses upon the reaction of five Central
American nations to United States military intervention.
The specific incident selected for study is the deployment
of United States troops to the Central American Republic of
Honduras in March of 1988. This incident appears to have
been the final action of former President Reagan's long
term political strategy in the region. Throughout the
majority of his tenure, President Reagan sought to exercise
the containment of communism within the region.
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Given this perceived need for containment, the target
of Reagan's regional policies was, clearly, the elimination
of the Marxist-Leninist government which existed in
Nicaragua and was led by Daniel Ortega Saavedra.
After many years, and the expenditure of countless
dollars in an attempt to fence in the Marxist-Leninist
doctrine which had come to manifest itself in Nicaragua and
threatened to take root in El Salvador, the Reagan
administration launched what appears to have been a last
ditch effort to demonstrate its resolve for its regional
policies. President Reagan was then, a lame duck, unable
to be reelected to a third term of office under United
States law. He, no doubt, realized that without decisive
action his policy of nearly eight years toward the region
would prove fruitless. Unless some action was taken, the
surrogate warfare strategy, which the Reagan administration
had pursued in the region, would be recorded in history as
a failure.
This almost certain eventuality may well have prompted
the President to commit forces to the region in a show of
American resolve. Beginning on the 16 of March 1988, more
than 3,000 United States troops were deployed to the nation
of Honduras in a military deployment exercise called
Operation Golden Pheasant. An excerpt from a briefing
delivered by United States Secretary of State, George
Schultz, provides a summary:
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Last night, the President decided to send two
battalions from the 82d Airborne Division and two
battalions from the 7th Infantry....Altogether this
involves about 3,200 men. All of the forces
involved are light infantry; that is, there is no
artillery.
The troops will take part in exercises that are
something ongoing, but they are sent in response to
a Nicaraguan troop movement into Honduras and in
response to, most particularly, a request from the
president of Honduras.^
As the saying goes "there are two sides to every
story." This is no less true of the Honduran-Nicaraguan
border dispute of 1988. According to the Nicaraguan
Government, the border incident never occurred. The
military operation code named Santo-88. had as its purpose
the expulsion of "Somozist mercenaries" from camps located
in the Northern region of Nicaragua, not in Honduran
territory. Accordingly, the Nicaraguan Government
maintained that the Honduran territory was never
violated.^
^Congress, Senate, Secretary of State George Schultz
speaking to the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for
Fiscal Year 1989: Hearing Before the Congress, United
States Senate, 100th Congress, 2d Session (Washington
D.C.: Department of State, 1989), 441.
^"Somozist mercenaries" can be taken to mean the
Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, or Contras, which
occupied camps in the sparsely populated
Honduran/Nicaraguan boarder region. This account is taken
from United States Government, Daily Report: Latin America
(24 March. 1988). (Washington D.C.: Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, 1988), 11.
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Whatever the truth of the matter may have been in this
instance, generally, there appears to be an abundant supply
of literature dealing with recent United States posture
towards Central America. Considerably less effort appears
to have been expended, at least by English speaking
scholars, in attempt to gauge the reaction of the Central
American nations affected by United States policy. In
order to fully understand this most important political
interaction, it is essential to view the episode
objectively.
My interest in the subject is at once academic,
professional, and personal.
As a political scientist, I well realize the importance
of this single event in the scope of United States foreign
policy. The confrontation of communism became a major
theme for United States policy makers in the wake of
Nicaragua's Sandinistan National Liberation Front's (FSLN)
rise to power in 1979.
An important ingredient in any analysis of political
phenomenon is the effect which a given action has upon the
actors involved. It is not clear, at this time, how the
nations of Central America felt about the intervention of
the United States into the affairs of this sovereign
nation, and into the region. The fact that the
intervention was conducted at the request of Honduran
president Jose Azcona Hoyo, does not in and of itself make
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for popular support. Doubtless, there are some Central
American scholars who would argue that the action which
this study seeks to investigate, might have been better
left to the nations of the region to solve, as these
nations had previously agreed to an internally devised plan
for regional peace. The Esquipulas II agreement and the
Sapoa cease fire agreement which immediately followed the
United States intervention, both lend credence to such
arguments. These scholars would likely base their
arguments on records from the meetings at which these
agreements were reached. I am sure that such studies do
exist. The review of Spanish language documents however,
is a task which far exceeds my current scholarly abilities.
What is available for my use, is work which has been
translated into English from Spanish. I selected for
analysis the texts of foreign broadcasts which emanated
from the region or those which expressed the views of the
region's international actors. These texts were originally
broadcast in Spanish and were collected and interpreted by
the United States Government's Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS). An obvious limitation of the
study is the fact that translations, although performed by
certified officials, may not be entirely accurate. Often a
translator may only render an approximation of the actual
transmission. This peculiarity is not, in my opinion,
sufficient to negate the results of a quantitative analysis
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of such data.
It is at the very least problematic, to assume that
media broadcasts serve as an indicator of public opinion.
This would be a difficult claim to support even in the
United States, where law dictates that broadcasts at least
be objective in nature. In societies, such as those found
on the Central America isthmus, there are clearly other
factors involved in determining exactly what is allowed to
be broadcast. The radio stations, television stations, and
newspapers, from which these texts were drawn, often are
subject to censorship from the national governments in
power, and at times to coercion from revolutionary groups.
To say exactly whose view is represented by the media
collected from this region is beyond the scope of this
thesis. Suffice it to say, that these transmissions, by
virtue of their foreign origin, may be assumed to represent
the views of the countries from which they were collected
to some uncertain degree. They may be assumed to serve as
an empirical referent for some measure of national
opinion. This study attempts to measure the degree to
which the individual nations of Central America opposed one
specific instance of United States intervention.
My profession, that of a United States Army officer,
causes me to have a very pointed interest in the Central
American region. As such, I may be called upon again to
implement national policy, as I was during Operation Golden
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Pheasant. 3
Lastly, the study is one in which I have personal
interest. As one might expect, over the years I have come
to be friends with a number of people who have served and
continue to serve in the region. My contribution to the
base of knowledge about this troubled region is made with
great appreciation of their collective and individual
efforts.^
As a Lieutenant assigned to the United States
Army's 82nd Airborne Division, I parachuted into Honduras
from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina in March of 1988. At the
time I had little understanding of our role there.
Knowledge of the circumstances surrounding this action
certainly was not essential to my performance of duty at
that point in time. Today, however, it becomes
increasingly important for me, professionally, to have a
clear understanding of the operations which I am called to
take part in.
^ These selfless and dedicated individuals have
endured hardship and danger in implementing the policies of
the United States. Some have even died in the process.
These soldiers and citizens are my colleagues, friends, and
compatriots. In many instances they have little or no
knowledge of the political importance of their sacrifices.
I know that it doesn't matter to many military service
members why a particular military action is taken. For
many, the expression "my country...wrong or right" sums up
a spirit of unquestioning devotion to duty. To be sure,
orders will be followed, so long as they are lawful.
Ignorance, however, is not bliss. Military persons are
also citizens. Just as citizens should be concerned with
the political actions of their nation, so also should be
the nation's soldiers. The concerns of soldiers about
military actions should, perhaps, be even more acute than
the population at large. For in the final analysis, it is
the military institution which will pay the greatest
cost—in human life—for poor political decisions.
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Having stated my academic, professional, and personal
motives, it is important to point out the importance of
this study to the political science community. By
measuring the response of the nations of Central America to
an incident of United States regional intervention, it
becomes possible to draw inferences about the effectiveness
of United States foreign policy in the region. In all
matters political, it is the support of the general
population which is of tantamount importance. Without such
support, any action is destined for eventual failure. The
results of this study may be useful in understanding the
success or failure of other military intervention
initiatives taken within Central America.
On the whole United States policies towards Central
America must be closely reexamined. As the post Cold War
world divides itself into regional blocs, as it appears
that it will, it is imperative that relationships within
the Western Hemisphere become both mutually productive and
mutually supportive. It is not clear whether.or not United
States' policies toward the region must be altered
drastically. Perhaps the periods of so called "Gunboat
diplomacy" are behind the hemisphere for good. Perhaps
they are not. The findings of this study may provide
political scientists with an indication of the
effectiveness of past policies toward the region. This
information may prove useful in the formulation of future
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international relationships and policies within the
hemisphere. At a minimum, it will quantitatively describe
the success or lack of success of a specific bilateral
military action, taken within a multilateral framework.
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CHAPTER 2
STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
The primary contention of this work is that the nations
of Central America, in aggregate, held a negative view of
United States military intervention in the border dispute
between Honduras and Nicaragua, March 1988.
Before embarking upon the actual study, a review of the
pertinent literature associated with Central America was
conducted. The literature review was limited to the
address of four basic areas. First, the identification of
major theories and paradigms which have been helpful in
understanding United States policy toward the region.
Second, the identification of internal regional policies
which were in place before the intervention and immediately
thereafter. Third, the literature review is used to gain
an appreciation of the amount of military and economic
support extended to the nations of the region by the United
States Government. And last, it is used to point out the
significance of the intervention, in terms of possible
theoretical support. In layman's terms, what exactly did
the action mean in terms of supporting or weakening the
theories which attempt to explain it.
The content analysis study is an attempt to
quantitatively analyze broadcasts from the region during
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the intervention of March, 1988, and compare them to a
similar group of broadcasts which were transmitted
approximately one month earlier. In this study, I identify
the frequency of anti-U.S. language, and rank the
transmitting or subject countries accordingly.
At the conclusion of this thesis, I comment upon the
relevance of the research data, and identify probable




We, like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants, can see
more and farther, not because we are keener and
taller, but because of the greatness by which we are
carried and exalted.
The ultimate goal of political scientific inquiry is,
of course, to explain phenomena and predict future events
where possible. Taken in the context of any science, it is
only through the labors of many within a field, and those
who have labored before us, that any understanding of
political phenomena is achieved. One might say that we
must "stand upon the shoulders of giants" if we are to see,
scientifically, anything at all. Truly, each of us today
is in the debt of our predecessors for their contributions,
or "shoulders", in the areas of theory and paradigm
formulation.
Today, Central American politics can be understood if
one subscribes to any of a number of existing schools of
thought within the realm of international relations. Among
these are the popular choices, globalism, pluralism, and
realism. Of these I have aligned myself, and my scholarly
^Bernard of Chartres, circa 1100 A.D., Quoted in
Maitland A Edey. Blueprints: Solving the Mystery of
Evolution. (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), n. 7.
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works with those political scientists who find political
realism the most useful of these choices.
Choosing a theory and subsequently a paradigm into
which one can focus scholarly efforts is essential
according to Thomas Kuhn. This study was conducted while
laboring under assumptions common within the popular
"balance of power" theory, as promoted by Hans Morganthau.
His theory, which is firmly rooted in realistic thought,
pits state against state in a never ending struggle for
power. Power he assumes, is the ultimate goal of all
nations. Morganthau asserts that the United States, as a
political entity, has exercised political realism but has
often shrouded such actions in "moral abstractions".* It
has been this tendency which has caused the nation to
pursue objectives not clearly in the national interest in
recent years. He argues that initial actions (those taken
before the Spanish-American War) were in the selfish
interest of the United States, but masqueraded as morally
correct actions. Morganthau argues, further, that the
hemispheric relationships fostered by the United States
since that period have taken on a most unhealthy moralistic
bent. Morality, he argues, is a thing which is derived
^Hans Morganthau, "The Mainsprings of American
Foreign Policy," in American Foreign Policy: Theoretical
Essays. ed. G. John Ikenberry (USA: Harper-Collins
Publishers, 1989), 625.
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from a nation's internal political culture, and thus cannot
be effectively applied at the international level. In
light of this, he states:
Hence the antithesis between moral principles and
the national interest is not only mistaken but also
morally pernicious. A foreign policy derived from
the national interest is in fact morally superior to
a foreign policy inspired by universal moral
principles.^
Morganthau's realistic view is helpful in understanding
some of the paradigms which have become popular within
balance of power theory.
The paradigm which, perhaps, best explains recent
United States foreign policy toward Latin America, and
Central America specifically, is that of the containment of
communism. The importance of this as a paradigmatic
framework for explanation, cannot be understated.
In simplest terms, Thomas Kuhn believes that paradigms
exist for one purpose; to focus the efforts of the
scientists within a particular discipline. According to
Kuhn, the paradigm is a generalization about some
phenomenon, stated in terms broad enough to require further
refinement. This refinement will, and indeed must, come
from the adherents to the paradigm. These scientists will
go about the task of finding support for the paradigm, or
perish (professionally) in the process. Kuhn argues that a
^Ibid., 644.
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paradigm, once accepted as a the "school of thought" which
should be subscribed to, will suppress or replace all of
those which may have flourished previously. By necessity,
two paradigms for the same area of inquiry cannot
peacefully coexist indefinitely within the natural
sciences. At present, multiple paradigms coexist within
the social sciences which attempt to explain the same
social phenomenon. This contradiction is accounted for,
according to some political scientists, by the presence of
uncontrollable and often immeasurable variables which exist
within the discipline.
From an historical perspective, it is usually the case
that once accepted, scientists within the field scurry
about looking to shed new light upon the discipline (my
scurrying effort is, of course, this work). If, after a
period, the paradigm fails in enough areas, to explain
specific phenomenon, the paradigm stands in danger of
replacement. This replacement of one paradigm by another
is referred to as "scientific revolution". Such
revolutions are normally preceded by a number of anomalies,
or failures of the existing paradigm to explain that which
it was developed to explain. The new paradigm normally
redefines the entire realm. Work accomplished under the
old paradigm is normally discredited. Generally,
scientists will subscribe to a particular paradigm as long
as it continues to produce meaningful, useful explanations
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for most of the questions posed by the adherents.^
Clearly, it is only through selecting theories and
later guiding paradigms, that political science may move
forward. The paradigm which I have selected, that of the
containment of communism, currently meets the criteria in
much the way Kuhn would prescribe. As Kuhn points out:
In a science...the paradigm is rarely an object for
replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial
decision in the common law, it is an object for
further articulation and specification under new or
more stringent conditions.^
Given this description of a paradigm, it is not difficult
to see where Central American political science fits in.
Any scientific inquiry, David Easton would argue, must
be able to withstand certain rigorous processes. Science
is, according to Easton, simply a way of knowing. To clear
up the arguments which invariably arise from this
statement, Easton proposes that science differs from other
ways of knowing, such as religion, theology, metaphysics,
and intuition, in that science is inter-subjective. Things
known within the scientific community can be transferred
from one individual to another through the use of a single
tool, empiricism. Manifest in a variety of forms.
^Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. 2d ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1970), 43-91 passim.
^Ibid., 23.
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empiricism demands that if something is to be viewed as
"scientific” it must be subject to observation. If an
occurrence cannot be observed by anyone aware of the
observational criteria, it cannot be claimed as true within
the scientific community. Hand in hand with this notion is
that of repeatability.®
The contention that the United States has sought to
contain the expansion of communism within the world has
been empirically verified in at least three very obvious
instances. The first was the long-standing "Cold War"
which was waged in Europe for more than 40 years. The
second, and third were bloody confrontations with communist
threats in Southeast Asia. These were, namely, the Korean
and Vietnamese conflicts which the United States engaged in
during the 1950's and the 1960's and 70's, respectively.
These observable phenomena meet Easton's criteria of
inter-subjectivity and repeatability.
I join with the collection of scholars who contend that
the United States foreign policy toward Central America was
an exercise in the containment of a world-wide communist
threat. The research for this work was conducted within
this theoretical framework. The research design, one which
®David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into
the State of Political Science. 2d ed., (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc., 1971), Chapters 1 and 2 passim.
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employs content analysis as its primary tool, meets the
criteria of repeatability and inter-subjectivity as




To say that the foreign policy of the United States has
historically dominated the region of Central America is
perhaps a gross understatement of fact. Essentially, the
policies of the United States towards- this region have been
domineering and often coercive. In the period before World
War II, the relationships between the United States and the
countries which comprise the region, namely Costa Rica,
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, had been
based largely on the protection of American based
industries operating in the area. In the period between
the late 1890's and the second world war, the countries of
the region were often casually referred to as "the banana
republics”. Today, the region as a whole is still thought
of by some as the "Backyard” of the United States.
In the years following the Second World War, the
foreign policy of the United States can be explained
thorough the application of the theory of containment, as
expounded by George F. Kennan. As early as 1950, Kennan
made statements which were to eventually serve to
promulgate foreign policy for Central America. In summary;
....ensuring the safety of the region's raw material
(and their availability to the United States),
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seeing to it that Latin America could not be
militarily exploited by the enemies of the United
States (especially the Soviets), and preventing any
outside ideological influence from turning the
southern part of the hemisphere against us.
Most important of all, as Kennan saw it, no
communist power must be allowed in power. "it is
better...to have a strong regime in power than a
liberal government if it is indulgent and relaxed
and penetrated by communists.”^
It was the loosely defined concept of national security,
applied to countries around the world under the doctrine of
containment, which lead to the formulation of domineering
United States foreign policies toward less developing
nations. In order to "contain” the threat of communist
expansion, United States policy makers apparently felt that
repressive policies were both essential and justifiable.
This hard-line attitude was prevalent among presidential
administrations up to that of former President Jimmy
Carter. The Carter administration sought to reverse what
the President called America's "inordinate fear of
communism”.^ President Carter attempted to incorporate
his moralistic, Christian background into American foreign
policy, with disastrous results. Calling for sweeping
^George F. Kennan, American Foreign Policy
1990-1950. (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1960), In
James Chace, Endless War: How We Got Involved In Central
America-and What Can be Done. (New York; Vintage Books,
1984), 53-54.
^George Black, The Good Neighbor; How the United
States Wrote the History of Central America and the
Caribbean. (New York; Pantheon Books, 1988), 132.
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changes in Central America under "human rights" programs,
the President soon found that stability within the region
was deteriorating. The death blow to his regional policy
was the fall of Nicaragua in 1979. For all his good
intentions, history now credits him with the loss of
Nicaragua to communism. In the eyes of many hard-line
anti-communists within the United States Government, this
failure was roughly equivalent to allowing the creation of
"another Cuba" within the hemisphere. Intervention in
preventing this occurrence was, to say the least
problematic, for a number of reasons.
The fall of [Anastasio] Somoza, followed quickly by
insurgent challenges to United States' backed
regimes in Guatemala and El Salvador, provoked an
immediate military response from Washington. The
Carter administration had found it difficult to
intervene militarily on behalf of Somoza on two
grounds-the dictator was an international pariah and
the memory of Vietnam meant strong domestic
opposition to another United States military
adventure in the third world.^
The eventual response, of course, was the return of
American foreign policy in the region to the hard-line
anti-communist factions within the United States
Government.
Under the administrations of Presidents Reagan and
Bush, emphasis was placed upon preventing a "domino effect"
^Roger Burbach, The Politics of Intervention; The
United States in Central America. (New York: The Monthly
Review Press, 1984), 93.
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within the Western Hemisphere. The turn of United States
policy towards humanitarian interests and regional
self-determination proved to be but a short respite in
history. A well intentioned President Carter lacked the
domestic political clout and the international backing to
carry out his humanitarian policies. Specifically, he was
unable to lobby Congress for the funds to provide economic
aid, in sufficient amount to prevent insurgency. As a
result of his domestic failure President Carter was unable
to effectively implement United States policy in the
region. Similarly, United States supported leaders in the
region were unable to maintain effective control of their
governments. President Carter's difficulties are essential
to understanding the reemergence of containment, as it was
applied to Central America during the decade spanning 1980
to 1989.
To be sure, the Reagan administration assumed office
with the intention of reversing what it perceived as an
expansion of communism. Armed with what was perhaps dated
ideology, President Reagan embarked upon a campaign aimed
at the eradication of leftist governments in the region.
Central America was almost an obsession with Reagan,
unlike previous Presidents, who have looked East and
West for dangers and challenges...Reagan looked
south....This stemmed, in part from a lack of
experience; when he took office Reagan was as
inexperienced in foreign affairs as Carter had
been. He knew only what he was against. In Central
America, he was very much against any expansion of
the Sandinista movement. What he was for was less
22
clear. 4
With Nicaragua as the focal point, United States policy
returned to the ideology employed in Korea and Vietnam,
albeit with a decided preference for use of indigenous
forces rather than American soldiers. The strategy was,
however, nearly identical to that employed previously to
stop communist expansion in Southeast Asia during the early
1960's. In each instance the United States established
logistic support bases, indigenous force training bases,
and furnished armament for countries offering to oppose
communist expansion.
The United States, under the stewardship of President
Reagan, was firmly resolved to stopping the
Marxist-Leninist government of Nicaragua from spreading its
ideology throughout the region. How this containment was
accomplished, and it appears that this has been
accomplished, is specifically addressed later in this
literature review.
The Reagan administration employed what has come to be
known as the confrontationist approach to communist
presence within the hemisphere. By forcing the United
States Congress to accept a central premise, that communism
^Steven E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism; American
Foreign Policy Since 1938. (New York: Penguin Books,
1988), 328.
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could not be tolerated in the hemisphere, President Reagan
was able to gather support, however reluctant, for his
hard-line regional policies. He was even somewhat immune
to criticisms that alternative (less confrontational)
policies might be employed rather than militarism. The
promise that he was "going to do something" about
communism, was his advantage over opponents and nay
sayers. The very fact that President Carter had allowed
Nicaragua to "go communist" represented a weakness in the
armor of his Democratic party opponents in Congress:
Reagan recognized this critical weakness in the
opposition when in his Central American policy
address to a joint session of Congress, on April 27,
1983, he declared that in Central America the
president and the Congress shared a "responsibility"
to defend United States' "vital interests." His
last words. Who among us would wish to bear
responsibility for failing to meet our shared
obligation?" were a direct threat to the Democrats
that they would be blamed if Central America were
"lost.
Although formally stated in 1983, the implications of
"losing" yet other countries in the region to communistic
expansion were clear almost immediately after the fall of
Nicaragua.
The first indication that things would be different
under the Reagan administration was the dramatically
increased military budget for the region. It should be
^Burbach, Politics of Intervention. 88.
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noted that the beginning of the military budget increase
was actually a result of a conscious decision on the part
of President Carter to turn away from human rights policies
in favor of those which have traditionally proven more
effective. The example of United States military aid to
the country of El Salvador is indicative of the shift in
policy which President Carter foresaw, and in fact, laid
the foundation for;
Although human rights conditions actually grew much
worse in 1980, reaching over 1,000 deaths per month,
United States' military aid rose from nothing in
1979 to $5.9 million in 1980 and $35.5 million for
the 1981 budget, the last formulated by Carter.®
Once in office President Reagan spent much of his time
attacking communism and bolstering United States military
capability. The President focused a good deal of his
foreign policy attention on the United States' "backyard."
This is not to say that other theaters or regions were
ignored. They were not. In fact, the overall United
States defense budget was significantly increased during
his tenure in office. Increased military expenditures were
complemented by several forms of economic aid. Assistance
to the region should be understood in the context in which
it was extended; the return on investment was to be the
^Robert E. Biles, Inter-American Relations; The
Latin American Perspective. (Boulder, Colorado; Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1988), 35.
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democratization of the region's internal governments. Only
by fostering free elections could the United States hope to
isolate Nicaragua from the other nations in the region. By
employing a form of political ostracism, United States
policy makers hoped to eventually achieve homogeneity in
Central America. One of the most significant obstacles to
this line of policy was the very presence of the right wing
leaders already in power. As pointed out by one political
scientist:
Elections were designed to accomplish a number of
objectives, all of them aimed at undermining the
revolutionary alternative. Most importantly,
restoring electoral democracy was viewed as a key
step toward opening the flood gates of United
States' economic and military aid. If centrists
could be lured into the government, all the better;
but even if the right continued in power, at least
it would be cleansed.'
The objective was not necessarily to remove conservative
dictators, but rather to have them seen as legitimate. It
was hoped that through the election process the disgruntled
masses might feel that their leaders were more responsive
to their needs. If this faith could be instilled, violent
revolution from the left, as had already occurred in
Nicaragua, might be avoided.
As already alluded to, one of the primary tools
employed to contain the Sandinista National Liberation
^Burbach, Politics of Intervention. 56.
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Front, or FSLN,® was the use of regional military force.
Perhaps the most controversial outcropping of the whole era
was the United States' support and training of the largely
Honduran based counter revolutionary forces, or Contras.
Also instrumental in the containment policy was the
bolstering of indigenous troops in El Salvador. Less
direct political tools were used to secure the cooperation
of Costa Rica and Guatemala. Full appreciation of the
region's political climate may be gained by examining each
of the countries in turn, and then addressing the region's
internal political processes as viewed in aggregate.
NICARAGUA
This comparatively small state came to dominate United
States' Central American policy in the 1980's. Perhaps
weakened by the human rights initiatives of President
Carter, the regime of Anastasio Somoza, was, by 1979,
completely incapable of effective government. Unable to
exercise internal control and alienated from political
support in Washington due to gross violations of basic
human rights, the Somozan government gave way to the
®Biles, Inter-American Relations, 35.
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revolutionary forces of the FSLN. ^
The FSLN, it has been argued, may have actually enjoyed
normal capitalistic relationships with the United States'
and other nations in the hemisphere, had proper
encouragement and support for the new government been
offered. Instead the FSLN was greeted by the United
States, not as an alternative to what had been an
intolerable dictatorship to the majority of Nicaraguans,
but as a menace. This start on the wrong foot, was
followed by dogged determination on the part of United
States policy makers to confront this communist threat, and
to remove it from hemispheric relations.
EL SALVADOR
Seen by United States policy makers as the next
"domino" likely to fall in the region, El Salvador became
the focal point of a military strategy designed to confront
^Black, The Good Neighbor. 160. These forces, often
referred to as Sandinistas, seized Managua in that year,
and set up a Marxist-Leninist based government.
Interestingly, the term Sandinista is fashioned after the
Nicaraguan guerrilla leader Augusto Cesar Sandino. This
man, popular during the 1920's, was renown within Central
America for his anti-imperialist views. He was also seen,
by those who adhered to his philosophies, as someone in the
same class as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, or
Abraham Lincoln, because of his revolutionary stances. In
short, his image was resurrected to serve as the martyr for
the anti-imperialist ideology of the FSLN.
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communism. As Nicaragua was already •'lost” little could be
done except to insure that the ideologies of Marx and Lenin
did not spread throughout the region, with the possible end
result of "losing” the entire Central American isthmus.
This strategy, implemented with a lavish dose of United
States' greenbacks, had as its objective the defeat of
another left-wing revolutionary group. The targeted group,
the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN),
proved to be quite credible in its contest for control of
the El Salvadoran government. So credible was this force
that:
While United States' military assistance had
strengthened El Salvador's armed forces, the
military capacity of the revolutionary forces had
also increased significantly. Clearly there was no
cheap victory in sight and, in fact, administration
officials [United States] in early 1982 had already
begun talking about a war that would go on for "five
or six years more”, until the end of the 1980's.^®
In the years that were to follow, the United States was
to become increasingly entwined in the direction of the El
Salvadoran counterrevolutionary effort. Again, the
emphasis was upon the use of El Salvadoran troops, rather
than American soldiers. There seemed to be no ceiling,
however, on the supply of the very best available armaments
for Salvadoran military forces. Liberal too, was the
supply of "advisors" and technical assistance personnel
^^Burbach, Politics of Intervention. 83.
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furnished to the El Salvadoran Government. During the
decade of the 1980's the United States spent countless
millions of dollars on this single project. The peak year
of spending appears to have been 1987, when 1,257.6 million
dollars was allocated for economic and military aid for all
of Central America. Of this, El Salvador received the
largest share, 557.8 million dollars, of the total aid
package.With the increased expenditure of funds, the
United States began to take an increasingly active role in
the management of military operations against the FMLN.
The Salvadoran army and security forces have grown
from 13,250 effectives in 1980 to 55,000 in 1987.
Other security forces...raise the total troop
strength to 110,000....By 1983 it was clear that
this army was losing to the popular forces, and
since that time the United States has taken over the
management of the war. It has reorganized the
command structure and its "advisers" aided by
continuous United States' air reconnaissance, not
only dictate strategy, but direct field
operations.
This external dominance of the military affairs of a
country was to be simultaneously replicated, through use of
a different strategy in the neighboring country of
Honduras.
^^Richard P. Cronin, "Central American Peace
Prospects; Overview." in Congressional Research Service
Review. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Vol 9-4, 1988), 23.
^^Gary MacEoin, Central America's Options; Death or
Life. (Kansas City; Sheed & Ward, 1988), 95.
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HONDURAS
During the decade, their did not exist a large,
credible, insurgent force within the borders of Honduras.
Honduras, however, shared a huge land border with communist
Nicaragua. As a result, Honduras came to be seen as a
country to be protected against the spread of such
ideologies as those which had manifested themselves in
Nicaragua under the leadership of Daniel Ortega and the
FSLN.
To combat the perceived Southern scourge, the United
States began the training and arming of the Nicaraguan
Counter Revolutionary force, or the Contras as they were
popularly known. One author questions whether or not the
military buildup in Nicaragua was provoked by a border
buildup of irregular Contra forces, or vice-versa. He
argues:
....in 1980, armed attacks by the Contras began from
bases in Honduras, a fact that President Reagan
conveniently overlooked when he said the Sandinista
military buildup began two and a half years before
the United States backed rebels [Contras] took up
arms. In fact, it was not until many months after
the Contra attacks began that Nicaragua received its
first shipments of heavy Soviet made arms. And two
white papers issued or revised by the United States'
Departments of State and Defense in 1985 show that
the Soviet-bloc military supplies to the region were
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not significant until 1982.^^
While it is not clear who provoked whom in this border
build up, it is clear that such a buildup did occur and did
result in armed clashes between the Contras and the forces
of the FSLN.
COSTA RICA
From a military stand point, Costa Rica was powerless
to "stop the spread of communism." This, at least, was
true if one requires such action be accomplished through
force of arms. Often seen as a peaceful haven amidst the
Central American turmoil, this tiny nation, which has not
had a standing army since 1949, sought to remain neutral
between the parties to the conflict and thereby act as a
bridge for negotiations. Although its military involvement
was minimal, Costa Rica played a significant political role
in the region on a number of occasions. Perhaps the most
important of these was the stand taken on the Contadora
Peace•Agreement, and the leadership displayed by Costa





Plagued also by left-wing revolutionary undertones,
Guatemala was of great concern to United States policy
makers during the 1980's. It, however, did not receive the
kind of direct attention that was vested in its neighbors
El Salvador and Honduras. As one political analyst points
out:
Three factors have helped the right maintain control
of Guatemala. While the population is the largest
in Central America, nearly half of Guatemala's
citizens are Indians, traditionally outside of
active politics and impervious to appeals from the
left. Furthermore, Guatemala's Central American
neighbors, El Salvador and Honduras, also were under
firm military control, insulating Guatemala from
external subversion. Finally, high coffee prices
and conservative economic policies produced a strong
economy that reduced middle-class discontent.
Although an area of great concern early in the decade,
Guatemala eventually moderated and became less an object of
United States' foreign policy in the waning years of the
1980's.
Thus far I have yet to address Central American
attempts to resolve these problems without external
assistance. Certainly there were capable leaders, who did
dare to stand at the helm. Perhaps the most noteworthy.
^^Thomas Draper,
America. (New York:
Democracy and Dictatorship in Latin
The H.W. Wilson co., 1981), 40.
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although there were others, was Costa Rican President Oscar
Arias.
Before discussing the achievements of President Arias,
some background information is essential. In January of
1983, the leaders of several powerful Latin American
nations met on the Island of Contadora, off the Pacific
coast of Panama, to discuss a regionally directed solution
to the Nicaraguan problem:
The Contadora Group produced a draft treaty to be
signed by all five Central American nations. It
would end support for the irregular forces in the
region, prohibit the use of one country as the base
for guerrilla warfare against a neighboring country,
prohibit foreign military bases in the region, and
establish verification procedures, including on-site
inspection....At a meeting of the European Economic
Community (EEC) in San Jose, Costa Rica, Secretary
of State George Schultz telegraphed every European
foreign minister at the meeting urging them to deny
all economic aid to Nicaragua "because of its
refusal to sign the Contadora Peace
Agreement."...before the telegrams reached Costa
Rica, Nicaragua had announced it was ready to
sign.^^
Quickly thereafter, the United States changed course.
Employing an arsenal of political and economic tools,
enough pressure was brought to bear that Honduras and Costa
Rica reversed their positions; both countries refused to
sign the treaty.




Central America’s Potions; Death or
Sheed & Ward, 1988), 108.
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July of 1987, after presenting a series of revisions of the
original Contadora Peace Agreement to the region's
leadership, President Arias was successful in"securing the
signatures of all five Central American nations. The final
version of the plan became known as Esguipulas II, thus
distinguishing it from all former versions. The decision
by the Presidents of these countries was tantamount to an
ouster of the United States from the region's political
circle. It was clearly a decision to move toward
regionally designed solutions as opposed to those imposed
by extra-regional powers.
Esguipulas II gave notice that Central American states
were indeed capable of effective self government. This was
in stark contrast to the original provisions upon which the
Organization of American States was formed (OAS). As
asserted by former United States Assistant Secretary of
State for Latin America, Edward Miller in May of 1950:
American nations were authorized by the Rio Pact of
1947 and the Charter of the Organization of American
States (OAS) to intervene in any country unable to
defend itself. The United States, he [Miller]
believed, could always control the majority of the
OAS members and consequently could use the OAS to
protect its interests. However, he added, if that
didn't work, the United States still reserved the




This preference for unilateral action^ manifested
itself on several occasions during the Reagan
administration. Even after the apparent rejection of North
American conceived solutions for the region, the Reagan
administration continued to attempt to implement its
containment policies. If one seeks an ending point for
policies directed toward the region by the Reagan
administration, March of 1988 may well be it. It was
during this month that the United States President
dispatched approximately 3,200 troops to Honduras in
response to border clashes between that country and
Nicaragua. His decision brought actual United States
forces very close to armed conflict in the region. In what
was named Operation Golden Pheasant. United States forces
were flown overnight into the country of Honduras^®. The
mission was conducted at the specific request of the
Honduran president Jose Azcona. It, however, probably
represented a last ditch effort on the part of the Reagan
administration, to stabilize the region by use of force.
1 R • • • * •
This information is based upon personal experience
as a member of the military task force from the 82d
Airborne Division. Of note, the operation lasted nearly
two weeks, with the return of most of the troops to United
States' soil occurring on 30 and 31 March, 1988. During
the deployment United States' forces participated in
parachute and tactical operations with elements of the
Honduran Regular Army. These Honduran forces were not a
part of the counterrevolutionary, or Contra, forces.
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and according to a model developed by the United States.
It appears in retrospect, that this deployment may have
been pivotal in causing a change of events in the region.
The Nicaraguan government, shortly after the United States
troop deployment, agreed to a cease fire. This agreement,
arrived upon in the tiny Nicaraguan border town of Sapoa,
was to usher in a new period of peace within the region.
The Sapoa talks had been scheduled in advance of the United
States force deployment. The immediate presence of forces
external to the region may have provided the sense of
urgency needed for the two countries to seek peace.
Official statements by the United States Government
indicated that the forces were sent in support of the
Honduran Regular Army, not the Contras, still:
Most remarkably, the Sandinistas sat down with the
Contras. The two sides agreed to a cease fire in
May 1988 that brought a relative peace to the
countryside and assured a suspension of United
States Military aid to the Contras through all of
1989.
The election, and inauguration of former United States
Vice President George Bush to the post of President,
ushered in a new era of relations in Central America. The
new President immediately began mending fences. President
Bush was no less a hard-line anti-communist than was
IQ.
■‘•^Clifford Krauss, Inside Central America: Its
people. Politics, and History. (New York: Touchstone
Books, 1991), 165.
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Reagan. The key difference appears to have been President
Bush's knack for foreign policy. Aware that military force
was not the only "stick" that could be used in combating
communism. President Bush opted to make an attempt to find
a political solution.
President Bush's first hurdle was to decide what action
should be taken to resolve the Contra issue. By openly
praising the Arias plan, President Bush had parted company
with his former superior. What remained from the Reagan
era was the baggage of the Contra rebels. It is doubtful
that King Solomon could have found a better compromise,
given this situation. President Bush decided to neither
support nor abandon the rebels. Military aid to the
Contras was suspended, in accordance with the provisions of
Esquipulas II. The compromise arrived upon, and urgently
needed to appease the right-wing members of the United
States Congress who had supported the Contras, was to
provide only humanitarian aid. This did not violate the
conditions of the Arias plan but did demonstrate, in a
decidedly limited way, U.S. Congressional resolve to
support a cause which the Reagan administration had seen as
entirely worthwhile.
p n t » »
^Robert Pastor, "The Bush Administration and Latin
America: The Pragmatic Style and the Regionalist Option."
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. (Fall,
1991), 8-10.
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By pledging not to provide military support to the
Contras, President Bush allowed negotiation room for
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega. This respite from
confrontation was welcomed by Ortega and promptly acted
upon. Ortega proposed that Nicaragua would hold free
elections in February of 1990. As it turned out:
Daniel Ortega was sincere about holding free
elections. He believed it would unlock European
aid, lift the United States' embargo, and end the
Contra war, and his pollsters convinced him he would
win. To preclude a repeat of 1984, when he won an
election but a boycott by the opposition impinged
his mandate, he decided to invite credible
international observers who would attest to the
election's fairness.
Much to the apparent surprise of the United States, the
elections were held on February 26, 1990. Judging by the
results, they were fairly conducted, as Violeta Chamorro
was elected by an overwhelming majority. Equally
surprising was the fact that Daniel Ortega accepted
defeat. The state of political euphoria among United
States policy makers was perhaps tempered only by the
realization that Chamorro's victory had not been complete.
Although she had won the nations top office, the majority
of the nations officials were still loyal to the FSLN. A
possible source of increased optimism during the election
period was the fact that as Chamorro came to power, the
2^lbid., 11.
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Soviet Union was being dismantled before the eyes of the
world.
another
Her election, in any case, marked the end of yet




In order to understand the reaction of Central American
nations to United States military intervention in Honduras
during March of 1988, I opted to examine two groups of
foreign broadcasts. Both groups are similar in that they
were collected and translated by the U.S. Government's
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). This federal
government agency routinely collects and translates
material from seven geographic regions around the world.
Annually, in excess of 100,000 translations are produced
from these regions. The data was taken from translations
either originating in Central America or which had one of
the study's five Central American countries its subject.
The two groups of translations selected for study, are
separated in time by approximately one month. The first
group was collected by FBIS in late February, 1988, about a
month before the intervention. The second group is taken
from the period of March 1988, when U.S. troops, deployed
from the United States, were actually in Honduras. Each
group includes translations bearing dates within a selected
ten day time frame. The February time frame extended from
the 17th to the 26th of that month, and the March time
frame from the 18th to the 27th.
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These two groups, or data samples, were each then
divided into five subgroups. These sub-groupings were
based upon the country from which the broadcasts were
either collected or of which the given country was the
subject. For example, a translation may have been
collected from Argentina, but had as its subject the
remarks of the Costa Rican President. The sub-groupings,
are identical to those used by FBIS in creating archival
data from the Latin American sub-area identified as Central
America. The major difference is the omission of the
countries of Belize and Panama, which are identified by
FBIS as Central American countries. Extra-regional
translations dealing with the nations of Central America
included in this these texts, were from myriad source
countries, but all were categorized by FBIS according to
the subject country.
There are, perhaps, several weaknesses inherent in the
nature of this study. The fitst is the fact that the data
only represents, through translation, the actual messages
which were broadcast. Although FBIS employees are skilled
interpreters, some inaccuracies may persist within the
finished product. A second inherent weakness is the fact
that governmental agencies perform services, first and
foremost, in the best interest of the host government.
Given this, one can assume that there exists a bias.
Certainly, omissions have been made. Translations which
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have been included in the record do not represent all that
may have been collected by FBIS on a given day. Instead
they typically represent those broadcasts which were deemed
important by that agency, based upon established criteria.
It is sufficient, for the purposes of this study, to
recognize the fact that such criteria do exist within
governmental agencies, and thus, the material may not have
been collected in a completely objective manner.
Good analysis depends heavily upon the identification
of measurable, empirical referents within the realm of
political phenomena. The concept which this study has
sought to investigate is that of national opinion. The
measurable referent of this phenomenon is assumed to be
media broadcasts. The validity of this assumption cannot
be determined within the scope of this study.
In order to examine what is assumed to be a valid
referent for some level of national opinion, content
analysis was selected as the {primary research tool. This
widely varied method has proven, in past studies, to be a
very reliable one. These results have been obtained
through use of systematic, repeatable, procedures. Past
studies have been used to test hypotheses which had been
previously supported through use of more traditional
research methods. In these studies, the reliability of
results arrived upon through use of similar forms of
content analysis, have been firmly established. The theme
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selected for study was frequency of negative statements
about U.S. foreign policy. Admittedly, in this study,
simple enumeration of a single broad theme is the aim.^
Because the degree to which the data represents national
opinion is not known and because the method of content
analysis a reliable one, it can be said of this study that
the results are reliable, but not necessarily valid.
For the purposes of this study, examining the frequency
of a single theme was the most effective way of supporting
the hypothesis. Political Scientist Ole R. Holsti has
written:
The case for designing content analysis to yield
numerical data—although not necessarily solely in
terms of frequency—is a powerful one. Foremost
among the arguments is the degree of precision with
which one's conclusions may be stated. Descriptions
such as "45 percent" or "27 times out of a possible
30" convey information more precisely than
statements such as "less than half" or "almost
always"^
After selecting the data to be analyzed, it was divided
into countries, as noted above. The unit of analysis
selected was the sentence. In order to standardize the
units, each sentence was assumed to occupy two lines of
text. After determining the number of negative sentences
^Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social
Sciences and Humanities. (Reading, Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), 6-11.
^Ibid., 9.
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present in the text for a given country, this number was
multiplied by two to yield the number of negative lines of
text. The product was then divided by the total number of
lines of text for the given country. The result, when
converted to a percentage figure, was assumed to indicate a
measure of negative opinion toward U.S. regional policy.
The results of these surveys, both the February and
March groups, were then ranked, with highest frequency of
negative statements first and lowest frequency last. The
highest frequency was assumed to reflect the highest level
of negative national opinion of United States regional
policy.
The results from each group were combined to express an
aggregate regional level of opinion for February and March
of 1988. These two figures were then compared in order to
determine if the intervention may have had an effect on
regional opinion of U.S. policy.
The hypothesis of this work was, again, that the
nations of Central America held a negative view of the
intervention. The results of this inquiry supported the
hypothesis, as the study showed an increase in the




The hypothesis of this work was supported by
quantitative, content analysis of the research data.
Aggregate results showed the region to have experienced an
increase in the incidence of negative opinion of U.S.
policy of .36 percent. At first glance this figure appears
to be insignificant. Examination of this figure within
proper context, reveals that the increase is quite
significant indeed. The February text group revealed a
negative incidence frequency of 3.56, and March 3.92.
These numbers are very small in comparison to the body of
data as a whole. The percentage of increase, a figure just
above one third of a point, actually represents a much
greater change. When the percentage of change (.36) was
divided by the mean percentage of negative lines of text
appearing within the two sample groups (3.74), it was found
that this figure represented a variance of 9.62 percent
from the mean. This result amounts to quite a substantial
difference, when comparing the increase in the frequency of
negative lines with the average number of negative lines
within the research sample.
It is important to note that a significant portion of this
result may be accounted for by the inclusion of a country
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which displayed a very high incidence, in comparison to
the other four countries, of negative opinion toward U.S.
policy. This country, not surprisingly, was Nicaragua.
The findings varied greatly from country to country.
When viewed separately, the research hypothesis was not
supported in every case. In the case of Nicaragua it was
strongly supported. In Honduras, as one might expect, the
percentage of incidences of negative text actually declined
quite drastically during the March sample. Costa Rica and
El Salvador both provided support for the general
hypothesis by showing increases in their frequencies of
negative lines of text. Guatemala's results were
inconclusive, as there were no incidences of negative lines
of text in either the February or the March sub-samples.
What perhaps bears mentioning at this point, is the
fact that there existed a great disparity in the actual
amount of data collected by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service for the sample periods. The greatest
volume of translated text was collected on the nation of
Nicaragua. Second was Honduras, followed by El Salvador.
Costa Rica and Guatemala were forth and fifth,
respectively, with extremely small sub-samples.
In this study, the independent variable was assumed to
be the subject country, and the dependant variable,
national opinion. These variables were identified and are
shown, in the tables which appear below. Also, the
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significance of this information is discussed in turn.
NICARAGUA
The most extensively covered country within the region
was Nicaragua. During both sample periods, this country
showed a relatively high incidence of negative lines of
text. As show in Table 1, Nicaragua showed an increase in
the frequency of sentences which contained negative
statements about U.S. policy toward the region.
Interestingly, the incidence of negative lines decreased in
the days immediately following the cease fire talks held in
Sapoa, Nicaragua. In many cases, the language within the
broadcasts became conciliatory, or at least non-aggressive.
TABLE 1
INCIDENCE OF NEGATIVE LINES OF TEXT (NICARAGUA)
Total Lines Necf. Lines Ned. line (^)
February, 1988 5,253 184 3.50
March, 1988 1.689 102 6.03
Total 6.942 286 f+2.53)
HONDURAS
As one might have anticipated, the incidence of
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negative lines of text declined sharply after the arrival
of U.S. troops into Honduras. Broadcast texts from the
March period included positive statements from the Honduran
President Jose Azcona, and other state officials.
Determining the frequency of positive statements was beyond
the scope of this study. However, it is worthy of note
that there were a significant number of positive
statements, which may have served, in an alternately
designed study, to lessen or negate the findings for this
country.
TABLE 2
INCIDENCE OF NEGATIVE LINES OF TEXT (HONDURAS)
Total Lines Nea. Lines Necr. line
February, 1988 183 14 7.65
March, 1988 1.044 20 1.91
Total 1.227 34 (-5.74.)
COSTA RICA
The FBIS apparently had a low priority for collection
for this country and for Guatemala. So limited was the
data, that the results from these two countries should be
viewed with a good deal of scepticism. Although the
findings, shown in table 3, indicate a small increase in
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the frequency of negative lines of text from February to
March, it is indeed probable that the sub-samples are too
small to be reliable.
TABLE 3
INCIDENCE OF NEGATIVE LINES OF TEXT (COSTA RICA)
Total Lines Neo. Lines Nea. line f%)
February, 1988 143 -0- -0-
March, 1988 361 4 1.10
Total 504 4 r+l.10^
EL SALVADOR
The sub-sample size for El Salvador was adequate for
producing reliable results. In instances where negative
statements toward the U.S. were found, these were primarily
broadcasts from El Salvador's*FMLN. There appeared in the
text, again, several instances of favorable statements
about U.S. regional policy including the statement by El
Salvadoran Deputy Foreign Minister Joaquin Maza Martelli
thafthe deployment of U.S. troops on Honduran territory




INCIDENCE: OF NEGATIVE LINES OF TEXT (EL SALVADOR)
Total Lines Nea. Lines Nea. line
February, 1988 396 18 4.54
March, 1988 679 32 4.71
Total 1.075 50 r+0.17^
GUATEMALA
The findings for the data available on Guatemala
probably highlight, more than anything else, the low
priority the U.S. Government placed on events in that
country. Standing alone, the data is entirely
inconclusive. It should be noted as well, that the
Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo did comment favorably
upon the cease fire agreement reached in Sapoa with this
statement:
We will consolidate peace in Central America, and it
will become an example to the world....We support
any decisions seeking to fulfill commitments to
bring peace to Central America, which will serve as
examples for other nations such as El Salvador, so
^Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily
Report: 21 March 1988. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office), 9.
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irregular forces may join political life in the
country.
The data collected from Guatemala, while not of great
significance when viewed in isolation, was nonetheless
important in gaining insights for the region as a whole.
The data is summarized below in Table 5.
TABLE 5
INCIDENCE OF NEGATIVE LINES OF TEXT (GUATEMALA)
Total Lines Nea. Lines Nea. line
February, 1988 91 -0- -0-
March, 1988 256 -0- -0-
Totals 341 -0- LQJ
AGGREGATE DATA
The figures in Table 6. (below), are for the sample
groups of March and April Combined. As previously
mentioned, the study takes on different proportions when
viewed in aggregate. The data is captured by country, in
rank order, based on greatest percentage of negative text.
The country containing the greatest frequency of negative
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily
Report; 28 March 1988. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office), 10.
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lines of text is ranked first, and totals are displayed at
the end.
TABLE 6
NATIONAL RANKINGS FOR CENTRAL AMERICA
Total Lines Nea. Lines Nea. line f%)
Nicaragua 6,942 286 4.11
El Salvador 1,075 50 4.65
Honduras 1,227 34 2.77
Costa Rica 504 4 0.79
Guatemala 347 -0- -0-
Totals 10.095 374 3.70
Table 7 compares the February group to the March group
and indicates overall increase in negative
TABLE 7
line frequency.
INCIDENCE OF NEGATIVE LINES OF TEXT (REGIONAL)
Total Lines Nea. Lines Nea. line f%)
February, 1988 6,066 216 3.56
March, 1988 4.029 158 3.92
Totals 10,095 374 r+0.36)
The findings of this study support the research
hypothesis. However, there are certainly a number of
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improvements which could be made in future studies in this
area. To be sure, the bulk of the data deals with the
countries of Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. In
order to gain a more accurate picture of political
phenomena within the region, it is essential that future
researchers gather larger, and more homogenous samples. It
would have been helpful to have had more data for Costa
Rica and Guatemala. In order to accomplish this, given the
limited attention afforded these countries by the
collecting agency, it would be necessary to lengthen the
time periods of the samples. Perhaps even numerous
samplings of several months before a given event would be
useful.
The raw data collected by the FBIS might readily
support content analysis studies which deal with the public
speeches of world leaders and international policy makers.
Such speeches were found to be recorded and translated in
their entirety, to include greetings and salutations.
Political scientists interested in measuring the frequency
with which a given leader repeats a particular theme, might
find this to be fertile soil^. Any number of other
methods of content analysis might be applied, in future
^Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social
Sciences and Humanities. (Reading, Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), 5-17, passim.
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studies, to the data collected by FBIS. The information is




Central America, and indeed Latin America, appears to
be charting a new course for the fast approaching 21st
century. It appears that President Bush during his
administration attempted to move away from militaristic
solutions, in favor of economic ones. There are a number
of regional theories from which to draw when pondering the
future of Central America. Most of these theories do not
deviate significantly from basic Central-peripheral,
hegemonic models. Most such theories stress the United
States as the economic and political center of the Western
Hemisphere, with the nations of North, Central, and in some
instances. South America at the periphery.
One such theory postulates that the world of the next
century will be divided into three basic trading blocs,
centered around the United States, Europe (with Africa as
an appendage), and Japan.^
Whichever model is used, the implication is largely the
same; the United States will continue to dominate the
hemisphere. As such it can be expected that it will
^Joseph E. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing
Nature of American Power. (USA: Basic Books, 1991), 236.
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continue to attempt to direct Central American policy to
serve its own interests. Although the role of military
forces in the region has diminished in recent years under
the Bush administration, there seems to be a new proviso
which now stands as a condition of nonintervention in the
region. That proviso is democratic leadership. It appears
that so long as the nations of the region are
democratically, and freely elected, the United States is
willing to maintain a "hands off" posture. As stated in
the Agency for International Development's (AID) Economic
Assistance Strategy for Central America 1991 to 2000:
Dramatic political and economic changes in Central
America, and in the world, demand a new United
States economic assistance policy for the region in
the 1990's. For the first time in history, all
Central American countries have democratically
elected governments. The region's presidents have
renewed their commitment to peace and mutual
interdependence. Also underway in the region is an
economic transformation that has the potential to be
as profound as the political transition of the
1980's. There is an unprecedented opportunity over
the next decade to achieve the political stability,
economic prosperity, and social justice that have so
long eluded the people of Central America.^
Political stability will continue to be one of the
primary objectives of United States foreign policy in the
region. Such stability will likely continue to be defined
“^Agency for International Development, Economic
Assistance Strategy for Central America 1991 to 2000,
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990),
introduction.
57
in terms of the presence of democratically elected,
noncommunist forms of government. The strategy goes on to
point out that AID "will increase support for democratic
institutions" in order to "enhance Democracy." The tenets
of the strategy include support of democratically elected
governments, continued emphasis on peace (a return to human
rights perhaps), renewed commitment to mutual
interdependence of the region's member nations, and
preparation of those countries for entry into the world
economy as credible competitors.
The strategy has ten guiding principles, which read
like a handbook for bureaucrats. In essence the principles
state how AID is committed to reinforcing the decision of
the region's Presidents during Esquipulas II. In short AID
will attempt to lend organization and direction to the
ideas of the region's leaders. This arrangement comes
complete, with purse strings attached. Failure on the part
of Central American leaders tb move forward with their
plan, as articulated and understood by AID, will
undoubtedly result in the suspension of assistance.
A more comprehensive inquiry into the future of the
region, conducted by the Brookings Institution, arrived at
similar conclusions. Topics addressed included the crucial
areas of economic development and disarmament for the
region. Several regional specialists, who conferred on the
subject, concluded:
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The three conditions... required are, achieving an
end to the fighting through a cease-fire, reducing
the size and weight of military forces, and forging
a regional security regime and a definitive peace
treaty that would demobilize insurgent armies. The
three conditions... had somehow to be achieved more
or less simultaneously, or at least in close
sequence.^
The demilitarization of Central America is an important
area which both the region's leadership and the United
States can ill afford to overlook. The tentative peace
which is presently enjoyed in Central America is certainly
hinged upon continued economic stability. The region's
member nations will probably require some form of economic
reform to combat the most extreme effects of economic
polarization. The presence of a viable middle class, one
which peasants can aspire to become a part of, will serve
as the greatest insurance against the resurgence of
extremist forms of government arising from the left or
right.
The political, economic, and military stability of the
region are areas which must be addressed in a meaningful
way if the fragile peace now enjoyed in the region is to
endure.
The cooperation shown by the signatories of the Arias
plan is encouraging. Central America, long viewed as the
^Ibid., 2-8
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backyard of the United States, has made an important step
toward autonomy. The connotation which goes along with a
region being a "backyard", or a place that requires
constant maintenance and upkeep by its "owner", certainly
continues to apply to the region of Central America. Not
yet ready to "go it alone" on the world stage, the region
will still require strong ties to a major trading power.
With the impending return of Nicaragua to the fold, the
region may well be in a position to end the fighting and
make real progress in the hemisphere. What is clear, by
all indications, is that Central America is now in a
stronger position to exert its own agenda items, as
demonstrated by the success of the Arias plan. Other
initiatives, which are surely forthcoming from the region,
may be taken more seriously in the future.
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